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Field programmable gate array (FPGA)-based systems are thought to be a practical option
to replace certain obsolete instrumentation and control systems in nuclear power plants.
An FPGA is a type of integrated circuit, which is programmed after being manufactured.
FPGAs have some advantages over other electronic technologies, such as analog circuits,
microprocessors, and Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), for nuclear instrumentation
and control, and safety system applications. However, safety-related issues for FPGA-
based systems remain to be verified. Owing to this, modeling FPGA-based systems for
safety assessment has now become an important point of research. One potential
methodology is the dynamic flowgraph methodology (DFM). It has been used for modeling
software/hardware interactions in modern control systems. In this paper, FPGA logic was
analyzed using DFM. Four aspects of FPGAs are investigated: the “IEEE 1164 standard,”
registers (D flip-flops), configurable logic blocks, and an FPGA-based signal compensator.
The ModelSim simulations confirmed that DFM was able to accurately model those four
FPGA properties, proving that DFM has the potential to be used in the modeling of FPGA-
based systems. Furthermore, advantages of DFM over traditional reliability analysis
methods and FPGA simulators are presented, along with a discussion of potential issues
with using DFM for FPGA-based system modeling.
Copyright © 2016, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC on behalf of Korean Nuclear Society. This
is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) are a type of pro-
grammable logic device. FPGAs can be utilized to construct
digital logic circuits. These programmable logic devices are
programmed by the end user to perform the necessaryom (P. McNelles).
sevier Korea LLC on beha
mons.org/licenses/by-ncfunctions, and certain FPGAs are reprogrammable. FPGAs do
not usually include software or operating systems, as the logic
functions are programmed (synthesized) onto the chip itself.
The programming itself is implemented using hardware
description languages (HDLs) [1]. A well-known HDL, named
VHDL (very-high-speed integrated circuit HDL), is used in thislf of Korean Nuclear Society. This is an open access article under
-nd/4.0/).
Fig. 1 e DFM nodes, transfer boxes, and connectors. DFM,
dynamic flowgraph methodology.
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performed by other electronic logics, such as analog circuits,
application-specific integrated circuits, microprocessors, and
PLCs. FPGAs can be used in different nuclear instrumentation
and control (I&C) systems, provided that they can be proved to
satisfy the safety requirements [2,3].
In the nuclear field,many I&C systems that are currently in
use in existing nuclear power plants (NPPs) are becoming
obsolete. FPGAs are being considered as replacements to those
systems. Compared with application-specific integrated cir-
cuits (ASIC) and analog circuits, FPGAs can be reprogrammed
if needed. Compared with PLCs and microprocessors, FPGAs
have been shown to have superior response time and faster
processing speed [4,5]. FPGA implementations have taken
place in Europe andAsia [6e8], and recently there is increasing
interest in these systems in Canada and the USA [9e11].
Very strict safety and quality requirements have been put
in place to ensure that the control systems in NPPs function
safely. This means that any FPGA-based systems would have
to undergo a thorough reliability analysis. To be used in an
NPP, an I&C system will have to meet certain qualitative and
quantitative reliability requirements; however, these re-
quirementswill vary among different regulators. In the case of
digital I&C systems, the use of software in the system must
also be verified. While FPGAs themselves do not run software,
the HDL code is used in configuring the FPGA, which can
introduce logic errors into the system. Therefore, both the
hardware and HDL logic components of FPGA-based systems
must be verified for FPGAs to be used in NPP I&C systems. In
this paper, the focus is on the HDL logic, including the Insti-
tute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) logic stan-
dards, important logical components of the FPGA, and a small
test system itself. Regulators may not set specific re-
quirements for FPGA-based systems; however, there is a
standard from the International Electrotechnical Commission
[12], and guides in the form of International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) [13] and Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NUREG) [14] documents that provide guidance on the design
and review of FPGA-based systems.
A failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) at the compo-
nent and system levels will determine the potential failure
modes that can be used as top events in the analysis of FPGA
logic. The FPGA logic in these cases will be analyzed to
determine the top and initiating events that could lead to
failures in FPGA logic subcomponents and in the logic of the
system itself. Analysis of FPGA hardware components is
beyond the scope of this paper.
There are many reliability analysis techniques in the
literature and in industrial practice. The methodology used
in this paper is the dynamic flowgraph methodology (DFM).
DFM is a dynamic (time-dependent) methodology used to
model and analyze digital control systems. In this paper,
DFM is shown to be able to validate the logic of FPGA-based
systems, including uncovering errors that occur in the
logic, and the effect those errors could have on the system or
system components. The use of ModelSim simulations adds
evidence to the DFM results, to help confirm that DFM can
accurately model FPGA system logic. This, in turn, helps
validate the use of DFM in the analysis of FPGA-based sys-
tems, and allows for DFM to be applied to more in-depthqualitative and quantitative analyses in future research
projects.
A detailed description of DFM and its advantages over
other reliability analysis techniques are presented in Section
2. Using this methodology, several important aspects of FPGA
systems are modeled and analyzed. Section 3 discusses three
important aspects of FPGA-based systems: the IEEE 1164
standard, registers, and configurable logic blocks (CLBs). Af-
terward, an FPGA-based dynamic signal compensator is pre-
sented, and a simplified sample FMEA is discussed. The
results of the analyses based on the models created in Sec-
tions 3 are presented and discussed in Section 4. Finally, the
advantages of DFM for FPGAmodeling and potential issues are
covered in Section 5.2. Dynamic flowgraph methodology
This section describes the theory and application of DFM.
Section 2.1 will provide an overview of DFM. Section 2.2 will
discuss the actual DFMmodel, and Section 2.3 will discuss the
main limitation regarding the use of DFM.2.1. DFM overview
DFM represents the system being analyzed using a directed
graphmodel. After themodel is built, it can be analyzed by the
inductive and deductive algorithms built into the methodol-
ogy [15]. The DFM deductive analysis will return a list of
“prime implicants” (PI), which are sets of occurrences that
would cause the top event (failure event). They are understood
to be themultivalued logic equivalent ofminimal cut sets. The
Fig. 2 e DFM model for logic and mathematical functions. DFM, dynamic flowgraph methodology.
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are referred to as “sequences.” DFM also incorporates time-
dependent behavior, allowing for both static and dynamic
(time-dependent) analyses [15].
DFM was created in order to model both hardware and
software components. This makes it a suitable method for
modern digital electronics such as FPGAs. It has been shown
to be more effective than well-known traditional methods
such as FMEA, fault tree, and event tree for modeling the
complicated hardware/software/firmware interactions in
digital systems [16e18]. Furthermore, DFM also was rated as
one of the methodologies for having the most positive fea-
tures and the fewest negative or uncertain features [16e18]. A
literature search of recent publications has consistently
shown DFM to be an effective method for reliability analysis
and probabilistic risk assessment of those systems [19e22].
2.2. DFM model and calculations
The actual DFM model consists of a series of process variable
nodes, connections, and transition boxes between these
nodes to show the relationship between system parameters
[15]. The nodes, transition boxes, and connectors are shown in
Fig. 1.
In Fig. 1, the nodes are used to represent the parameters,
process variables, or components of the system beinganalyzed. Continuous nodes represent a continuous behavior,
discrete nodes represent a discrete behavior, and logical
nodes show logic tests on the current state of the system. In
the analysis, all nodes work in the same way, but look
different in the model to make it easier for the user to un-
derstand what is being represented. A process variable node
can represent an output value, such as a temperature or
voltage output. Each node is then discretized into an arbitrary
number of states that the node can take on (e.g., “High
Voltage”, “Low Voltage,” etc.).
A transfer box represents functional relationships between
the components of the model (similar to the transfer function
of a system). The transition box works in a similar manner,
but includes time delays, allowing one to model the time
dependence of the system and/or the system components.
The user will input decision tables into these boxes, to
determine the output of the box, based on the combination of
inputs. These decision tables are then combined to make one
“critical transition table”when the model is run, and then the
PIs are calculated using the DFM algorithms [15]. An example
table is given in Section 3.2.
The causal connection shows the input and output of the
boxes (the cause-and-effect system behavior). The condi-
tioning connectors indicate the connections between the
input and output of functions and determine which function
is used.
Fig. 3 e DFM model for FPGA register. DFM, dynamic flowgraph methodology; FPGA, field programmable gate array.
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what is used to calculate the minimal cut sets in fault tree
analysis (FTA). Each PI is calculated as follows [15]:
PIj ¼
\n
i¼1
XðjÞi ¼
Yn
i¼1
XðjÞi¼1 (1)
where X represents each nodeestateetime step combination,
referred to as a “literal.”
There are several ways to calculate the top event probabil-
ity, once the PI probability is calculated. The first method is to
take the sum of all the PI probabilities, which is the default
method in the Dymonda software program. The second
method is to employ the “upper bound” approximation using
the PI probabilities, which is often used in FTA.However, these
twomethods are approximations and tend to overestimate the
top event probability, as the PIs may not always be mutually
exclusive. The exact top event probability can be calculated by
converting the PIs to mutually exclusive implicants and then
taking the sum of the mutually exclusive implicants [15]. The
conversion of PIs to mutually exclusive implicants can beTable 1 e Sample decision table for simplified register.
Inputs Outputs
Reset Enable Clock Input
1 * * * 0
0 0 * * 1
0 1 0 * 1
0 1 1 þ 0computationally intensiveand timeconsuming, therefore, one
of the aforementioned approximations is often used to
approximate the top event probability.2.3. DFM limitations
DFMhas certain limitations,with the largest issue being due to
the explosion of states or “state explosion” [22]. The inclusion
of a large amount of nodes and states can lead to very large and
complicated decision tables, creating a combinatorial explo-
sion of states during the analysis. This limits the application of
DFM to realistic systems of small- or medium-sized systems,
such as the FPGA test system shown in Section 3.4 [23]. State
explosion is not limited to DFM, as it is an issue for other dy-
namic methods, such as Markov models [24].3. Materials and method
In order to prove that DFM is accurately modeling the FPGA
logic and system properties, the DFM results must be
compared with the results from an established source. To
accomplish this, the VHDL code was used to create test sys-
tems, as well as testbenches. The testbenches would provide
input stimuli in order to test the VHDL test programs. The test
programs used synthesizable VHDL codes where possible,
which were also used to create the VHDL netlists. The Mod-
elSim simulator programwas used to simulate the VHDL code,
using the testbenches. The results of the ModelSim
Fig. 4 e CLB flowgraph with either “AND” gate or “OR” gate LUT. CLB, configurable logic block; CLR, clear; ENB, enable; LUT,
look-up table; MUX, multiplexer.
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sults of the DFM analyses, to determine the accuracy of the
DFM models.
The three principal aspects of FPGAs considered in this
paper are presented in this section. Section 3.1 will discuss the
IEEE Standard 1164, while Section 3.2 presents the register
modeling. Section 3.3 shows the FPGA logic blocks modeling.
An example FPGA test system of a signal compensator is
shown in Section 3.4. Lastly, Section 3.5 will present a
simplified FMEA that was used to obtain the failure data (top
events) for the DFM analysis.
3.1. IEEE Standard 1164
IEEE 1164 is an important standardwhen using the VHDL code
to program the FPGA. It is a package that is compiled into a
library and is often imported into VHDL files. This standard
defines important features, including nine-state logic, reso-
lution function, and Boolean functions, such as AND, OR, XOR,
and NOT. The Boolean functions AND, OR, XOR, and NOT are
defined in tables, and the remaining functions (NOR, XNOR,
and NAND) are made using NOT function [25]. The states for
the nine-state logic can be found in the literature [25]. DFM is
used to model the logic and mathematical functions based on
this standard. A DFM model consisting of the logic and
mathematical functions is shown in Fig. 2.
In Fig. 2, the logic functions includes AND, OR, XOR, NOT,
NOR, NAND, and XNOR functions. The inputs are set to be the
logic states given in [25], producing various combinations of
outputs. A similar method is taken with the mathematical
functions, where two inputs are added (In_Add_1 and
In_Add_2), and the sum is compared with the product of the
other inputs (In_Prod_1 and In_Prod_2). The output “G_Out” isthen the output from the “greater or equal to function” (shown
as a “less than” function in the netlist). The ModelSim and
DFM results are given in Subsection 4.1.
3.2. Register
The register is an important component of digital logic and
FPGA operation. It is commonly used in electronic systems to
store a data value and output it at a certain clock edge. In
FPGAs, these registers are used in many kinds of sequential
and recursive logics, when the algorithms require results or
data from previous time steps [26]. The DFM model for the
register is shown in Fig. 3. Here, the “Reset,” “Preset,” “Input,”
and “Data” nodes all represent input signals into the register,
where the transition box (entitled “Register”) performs as a
register in an FPGA would. A time delay on “1” is included, in
order to hold the data for a time step, similar to an FPGA
register. The “Reset” signal will reset the register to “0,” while
the “Clock Enable” signal will allow the register to store the
new “Input” value, and then output the new value after a time
delay (based on the “Clock” signal). If the “Clock” signal does
not allow the register to update the value, then the previous
input value (“Prev_Input”) is used instead. This model also
includes the “Clock_Period” (if it is longer/shorter than speci-
fied), “Clock_Cycle” (if the clock has a duty cycle that is
different from 50%), as well as a node for the previous input
(“Prev_Input”), as that can have an effect on the output.
The value from the “Output” is fed back into the “Pre-
v_Input”, after a delay. The “Clock” node was broken down
into four states, 1, 0,þ,e, to represent the clock transitions. To
allow the “Clock” state to cycle, the “Prev_Clock” node was
included, which will store the previous “Clock” signal (after a
time delay) and then output the next state to the “Clock”. State
Fig. 5 e Flowgraph model for FPGA-based platinum detector. FPGA, field programmable gate array.
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Table 2 e Sample FMEA for FPGA aspects.
Aspect Failure mode Cause Effect
IEEE 1164 Or ¼ 0 “X” logic
“H” logic
Mathematical error
G_Out ¼ 0 “U” logic Logic error
Register Output “X” “X” logic Memory error
CLB Output “1” Logical errors Incorrect CLB value
DSC Spurious Trip Constant error System failure
Missed Trip Input error (“X”) System failure
CLB, configurable logic blocks; DSC, Dynamic Signal Compensator;
FMEA, failure mode and effect analysis; FPGA, field programmable
gate array; “H”, High; IEEE, Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers; “U”, Uninitialized; “X”, Unknown.
Fig. 6 e ModelSim results for “OR_OUT” and “G_OUT” top
events.
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falling edge. The clock will cycle through the clock states as
the time step changes. The “Output” node includes states for
“1” and “0,” as well as extra states for the outputs for “Reset”,
“Preset”, and “Data”. The results are then funneled to the
standard “1” and “0” for the “Reg_Out” node. Results for the
register model and ModelSim simulations are given in
Subsection 4.2. An example of a decision table, similar to the
one used in the “Register” transition box is given in Table 1. To
save space, it was assumed that the “Previous Input” had a
value of “1.” It should be noted that the “*” represents a “Don't
Care” value.
In Table 1, it is seen in the first row that if the “Reset” signal
is received, then the “Output” is reset to “0,” regardless of the
other inputs. If the “Reset” signal is “0,” then the other inputs
will become relevant. In the second row, the “Clock Enable”
signal is “0,” so the register will not update the value, and the
“Previous Input” of “1” will be output again. If the “Clock
Enable” signal is “1”, but the “Clock Signal” is “0” and the clock
transitions on a rising clock edge, then the “Previous Output”
valuewill be output again. In the last row, if the “Clock Enable”
is “1” and the “Clock Signal” is “þ,” then the register will up-
date and output the new value of “0.”3.3. FPGA logic blocks
All FPGAs share certain basic components, namely input/
output ports, programmable interconnects, and CLBs. Input/Table 3 e Sample implicants for “OR_OUT ¼ 0” and
“G_OUT ¼ 0” top events.
Implicant
1 (node)
Implicant
1 (state)
Implicant
117 (node)
Implicant
117 (state)
AND_OUT 1 ADD_In_2
ADD_OUT
XX
XXIN_NA_1 H
IN_NA_2 1
In_A_1 1
In_A_2 1
In_N 1
NAND_OUT 0
NOR_OUT 0
NOT_OUT 0
XOR_OUT 0output ports are used to carry data signals to and from the
FPGA, while programmable interconnects are used to connect
the CLBs together. CLBs are of particular interest, as those
logic blocks contain the logic elements needed to perform the
desired logic functions. In the most basic form, each CLB will
contain a look-up table (LUT), register, and possibly a multi-
plexer (Mux) that can be used to bypass the register if desired
[1]. DFMwas used to create two separate logic blocks, onewith
an “AND” gate LUT, and the other with an “OR” gate LUT. This
will show how DFM can model the basic logic elements of an
FPGA, encompassing the components discussed in Sections
3.1 and 3.2. A block diagram is presented in Fig. 4.3.4. Platinum dynamic compensation
Neutron detectors are used in NPPs to monitor neutron power
(flux) inside the reactor core. Several different materials are
used, such as platinum, rhodium, vanadium, and cobalt. In a
Canada deuterium uranium reactor, platinum detectors are
used in safety systems due to their fast (prompt) response.
Platinum detectors are composed of multiple isotopes and
therefore have multiple decay chains [27,28]. Dynamic signal
compensation is used to compensate for the delayed response
of the detector, in order to obtain an accurate reading of the
current neutron flux. The details of the platinum detectors
and signal compensation can be found in [29,30].
Fc ¼ 0:89f þ 0:045f1þ 3:9sþ
0:017f
1þ 30sþ
0:021f
1þ 250sþ
0:045f
1þ 2;500s (2)
where Fc refers to the calculated neutron flux and f is the
actual neutron flux. Eq. (3) is a simplified transfer function for
the dynamic signal compensator [31]:
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
K1  K21þ T sþ
K3
1þ T s

I (3)Fig. 7 e ModelSim results for FPGA register analysis (top
event “Output¼ 1”). FPGA, field programmable gate array.1 2
where I is the current from the detector; K1, K2, K3 are co-
efficients; T1, T2 are corresponding time constants; and s is the
Laplace transform variable [27,28]. Appending the values for
K1, K2, K3, T1, and T2, Eq. (3) becomes as follows:
Fc ¼

1:066 0:028
1þ 30sþ
0:038
1þ 2; 500s

I (4)
Converting Eq. (4) to a state space representation yields the
following equations:
_FðtÞ ¼
0:0337 0
1 0

FðtÞ þ

1
0

IðtÞ (5)
FcðtÞ ¼ ½0:0142 0 FðtÞ þ ½15:99 IðtÞ (6)
The state space representation also included the scaling
factor, so that an input range of 0e10 V would produce an
output range of 0e150% full power (FP). The state space model
was then discretized, using the zero-order holdmethod, and a
sampling time of 0.5 seconds, resulting in the following
representation:
_FðtÞ ¼

0:9833 0
0:4958 1

FðtÞ þ

0:4958
0:1243

IðtÞ (7)
FcðtÞ ¼ ½0:0142 0 FðtÞ þ ½15:00 IðtÞ (8)
The block diagram for the platinum compensator is given
in Fig. 5.
In Fig. 5, the nodes “G_1”, “G_2”, and “G_3” are the logic
tests for the input being greater than or equal to the Trip
Setpoint(TSP), and “IV_2” and “IV_3” represent the additional
inputs. The “Phi(k)” node refers to the total flux calculation,
and the nodes named “A,” “B,” “C,” or “D,” which also contain
numbers (e.g., “A11,” “B1,” “C1,” D00) represent constants in the
state space equations in Eqs. (5) and (6). The registers (“Reg-
ister_1” and “Register_2”) store the outputs from Eq. (5) that
are needed for the calculation at the next time step. The
output of the state space equations is a neutron power, based
on the detector current, which is based on the neutron flux. As
the neutron flux is very high (generally of the order of 1014 n/Table 4 e Prime implicant for DFM FPGA register analysis
(top event “Output ¼ 1”).
Implicant 26 (node) Implicant
26 (state)
Implicant
26 (time step)
Clock ± e1
Clock_Period Normal e1
Clock_Edge_Trigger R_E e1
Clock_Enable 1 e1
DATA_Input No_DATA e1
Input 1 e1
Preset_Signal 0 e1
Prev_Clock 0 e1
Prev_Input 0 e1
Preset_Signal 0 e1
Reset_Signal 0 e1
DFM, dynamic flowgraph methodology; FPGA, field programmable
gate array.cm2/s), it is often expressed as a percentage of FP. To simplify
the calculations, the voltage input was taken in the range of
0e10 V, and the neutron power was scaled for 0e15%, with a
TSP set at 12.0%. In reality, the neutron power would have a
range of 0e150% FP, and the TSP being set at around 125% FP.
It can be seen that the previous values for F(t) are required
to calculate the correct flux. The registers (discussed in Sec-
tion 3.2) are used to store this information, therefore, the FPGA
code (and netlist) contains two registers. Additional code was
added, for trip logic. The flux value was compared with a TSP,
along with two other inputs, to create the two out of three
logics. The analysis results for the platinum comparator and
trip logic is given in Subsection 4.4.
3.5. Simplified FMEA example
This section will provide an example of an FMEA for the
different FPGA aspects discussed in Subsections 3.1e3.4.
These FMEAs produce the top events that are used in some
of the DFM analysis results, seen in Section 4. It should be
noted that not every DFM analysis considered actual fail-
ures, as the aim of the paper was to show the applicability
of DFM to modeling of FPGA-based system logic, and as
such the models included both correct and erroneous
behaviors.
Table 2 presents a simplified FMEA for failures that were
considered for the different aspects of FPGA logic. The first isTable 5 e Prime implicant for DFM FPGA register analysis
(top event “Output ¼ X”).
Implicant 16
(node)
Implicant
16 (state)
Implicant 16
(time step)
Clock ± e1
Clock_Period Normal e1
Clock_Edge R_E e1
Clock_Enable 1 e1
DATA 0 e1
DATA_Input No_DATA e1
Input X e1
Preset X e1
Prev_Clock 0 e1
Reset_Signal X e1
Trigger_Select Pos e1
DFM, dynamic flowgraph methodology; FPGA, field programmable
gate array.
Fig. 8 e ModelSim results for FPGA register analysis (top
event “Output¼X”). FPGA, field programmable gate array.
Fig. 9 e ModelSim results for sequence “Reset ¼ 1”.
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mathematical or logic errors (respectively), due to the pres-
ence of certain logic states. The “U” (Uninitialized), “H”
(High), or “X” (Unknown) logic states are generally used to
represent errors in simulation. These logic states can pro-
duce errors in mathematical/logic functions, resulting to the
incorrect (in this case) value of “0,” due to how the functions
are defined in the IEEE 1164 standard [24]. A similar issue is
seen with the register. If an “X” logic value is input into the
register, it would be stored, and the “X” would be output on
the next clock cycle, which could cause a failure at future
time steps.
The effects of the failure modes of the IEEE 1164 standard
and register are manifested when the larger FPGA aspects are
considered. Logic failures on mathematical/logic functions or
registers (such as “U” or “X” logic) can affect the entire CLB. In
this paper, an erroneous output of “1” (in this example) could
be produced, due to the “U” or “X” logic states. This may not
occur with the “OR” logic, depending on the other inputs, but
for other logic, such as “AND” logic, the output of the CLB
could be affected. This all builds up to the whole test system
level, where it is seen that a “Missed Trip” occurs due to an
“Input Error.” This could be due to an error of the input signal
itself, or due to errors passed along from the other compo-
nents (i.e., failure modes at the logic, register, or CLB level
cause failures at the whole system level). Lastly, it was seen
that “Spurious Trip” could occur not only through errors in the
subcomponents, but also through an incorrectly specified
constant, used in multiplication.4. Results
This section shows the results for the models created in Sec-
tion 3. In each case, the entries in the PI tables that are of theTable 6 e Sequence for initiating event “Reset ¼ 1.”
Sequence 1
(node)
Sequence 1
(state)
Sequence 1 (time
step)
Prev_Input 1 0
Reset_Type Asynch 0
Reset_Signal 1 0
Reg_Out 0 1most notable are italicized. It should be noted that in certain
ModelSim waveforms, the signals “Reset”, “Clock Enable”,
“Clock”, and “Preset” (if needed) were shortened to “CLR”
(clear), “CE” or “Enable,” “CLK,” and “PRE,” respectively, to save
space in the specific waveform graph.
4.1. IEEE 1164 standard results
The results for the DFM analysis and the ModelSim simula-
tions for IEEE 1164 are presented in this section.
Table 3 shows sample implicants for the IEEE 1164 DFM
model, with the ModelSim results given in Fig. 6. The top
events for both the logic and themathematical functions were
set at “0,” and the DFMmodel was run deductively, to find the
PIs. In total, there are 192 PIs for the “OR_OUT” ¼ 0 node and
104 PIs for the “G_OUT” ¼ 0 node. It was seen that the inputs
and outputs of the logic model matched up with the inputs
and outputs in the ModelSim simulation. The “H” logic in the
“In_NA_1” input produced an “X” value at the output of the
“XNOR” logic gate. This in turn caused the overall output of the
“OR” logic to read “0.” It was also seen with the mathematical
model, that an unknown state (“XX”) in the “In_Add_2” input
would cause the “Add_Out” output to also read “XX”, forcing
the “G_OUT” node to read “0” (false), indicating that an error
with one of the inputs could cause the trip signal not to
actuate. This is the same as discussed in Subsection 3.5.
4.2. Register results
The results for the DFM analysis and ModelSim simulations
for the register are shown in this subsection. In the ModelSim
waveforms, the “Input” node (signal) is denoted as “D,” while
the “Output” is denoted as “Q.” Table 4 and Fig. 7 show the
results for a register where the Output ¼ “1.”
The simulation in Fig. 7 had the top event “Reg_Out¼ 1” for
one time step. The state “R_E” refers to a rising edge clock
trigger, “Normal” clock period means that there is no clock
delay, and the “Synch/Asynch” refers to synchronous and
asynchronous processes, respectively. The time steps in this
DFM model were taken as one time step being equal to one-
half of the clock cycle. In Fig. 7 (Implicant 26), it is seen that
having an Input of “1,” with the “Clock_Enable” signal of “1”
and a rising edge clock and triggerwill produce the “Output” of
“1,” when it is not pre-empted by other inputs such as the
Reset, Preset, or Load signals. The ModelSim results will not
explicitly show values for the “Clock_Edge_Trigger” and will
not explicitly state if the “Clock_Period” is correct; it will just
show what the value is.
Table 7 e Prime implicant for DFM FPGA logic block
analysis (top event “Logic Block Out ¼ 1”).
Implicant 9 (node) Implicant 9
(state)
Implicant 9
(time step)
In_1In_2 11 e2
In_3 1 e2
In_4 1 e2
AND_Out 1 e2
Clock ± e2
Prev_Clock 0 e2
Clock_Enable 1 e2
Reset_Signal 0 e2
Clock 1 e2
Mux_S 0 e1
Prev_Clock þ e1
Reset_Signal 0 e1
In_1 1 0
In_2 1 0
In_3 1 0
In_4 1 0
DFM, dynamic flowgraph methodology; FPGA, field programmable
gate array.
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undesired outputs. This can include unknown values (“X”),
incorrect outputs, or incorrect clock transitions, as seen in
Table 5 and Fig. 8. In Table 5, the top event was set to
“Output ¼ X,” to simulate an error/failure state with the reg-
ister. In this case, an “Input” of “X” along with the “þ” “Clock”
transition on a rising edge clock, caused the “X” state to be
passed to the output. The “Input” is not overruled by a
“DATA,” “Preset,” or “Reset” signal (both “Reset” and “Preset”
signals are in the error state of “X”, so that does not preempt
the “Input”). The ModelSim results in Fig. 8 confirm this,
where the inputs of “Reset” ¼ “X”, “Preset” ¼ “X”, “CE” ¼”1”,
and “Input” ¼ “X” produce an “Output” of “X” (as discussed in
Subsection 3.5) when the clock transitions on a rising edge.
The sequence for an inductive analysis is shown in Table 6.
It was taken as an asynchronous reset signal of “1,” which
should pre-empt any other input combination and result in an
output value of “0.” As seen in Table 6, only the one PI is
produced, and it returns a value of “0,” as expected. This is
confirmed in the ModelSim simulation shown in Fig. 9 where
the simulation shown in Fig. 7 was run again, and this time
with the “Reset” signal set to “1.” As expected, all three out-
puts were “0.” In this case, if the asynchronous “Reset” (CLR)
signal is “1,” then the “Output” will be “0,” regardless of what
the other signals are, so the other signals in Fig. 9 have no
effect on the register output.Fig. 10 e ModelSim results for “AND” logic block “Top
Event ¼ 1 at TS ¼ 0 and TS ¼ e1”.4.3. Logic block results
The individual logic block models (“AND” and “OR”) were
analyzed, with the results shown in this section. The analysis
for the “AND” gate CLB was run for two time steps, with the
top event set to “Logic_Block_Out (‘LB_Out’) ¼ 1” at time steps
“0” and “e1.” This produced 23 PIs; two of them are shown
here. In Table 7, it is seen that the four inputs to the LUT
(“In_1” … “In_4”) are all in state “1,” which could produce a
value of “1” from an “AND” gate. When the clock transitions(“þ”) and the “Enable” signal is “1,” the “AND” value of “1” is
loaded into the register. The register value is then selected by
theMux Select signal (“Mux_S”), which is then output from the
logic block at TS ¼ e1 and TS ¼ 0. The corresponding
ModelSim results are seen in Fig. 10. It is seen that all four
input signals are at a value of “1,” the “Enable” is at “1,” and the
“Reset” is at “0,” so when the clock transitions to “1,” the
“LB_Out” transitions to “1” (due to “AND” logic) and stays there
for the next clock cycle. As the “Mux_S” signal is “0,” the reg-
ister is not bypassed.
When discussing the “OR” gate CLB, an inductive analysis
of one time step was chosen, with the results shown in Table
8. It was seen that each input was assigned a different logic
state. Owing to the “OR” gate and the IEEE 1164 definition, the
output of the “OR” gate is a “1.” The value is then stored in the
register, as the “Enable” signal is “1,” “Reset” signal is “0,” and
the clock transitions on the rising edge (“þ”). This value is
stored in the register for one time step (stored at TS¼ 0) due to
the “Mux_S” value being “0”. The signal stored in the register is
then output at the next time step (TS ¼ 1), making the CLB
output value equal to “1.” The ModelSim results for this
simulation are shown in Fig. 11. The “Reset” signal is “0,”
“Enable” signal is “1,” and the “Mux_S” signal is “0”; the reg-
ister is used again. The inputs this time include several po-
tential error states (“U” and “X”), which eventually resolve to
“1” due to “OR” logic when the clock transitions (as discussed
in Subsection 3.5).
4.4. Platinum comparator results
The results for the DFM analysis and ModelSim simulations
for the platinum signal compensator are presented here. The
models were run for the top events of “Trip” and “Total Flux
High,” and for “No Trip.”
In Table 9, it is seen that all the system components are
functioning correctly, except in one instance. The clock tran-
sitions “þ,” the “Reset” signal is “0,” and the “Clock Enable”
signal is “1,” allowing the new (correct) values to be output
from the registers. However, it was seen that the value of “D”
in the state space model was higher than it should be, causing
the value of “Phi” to be above the setpoint. A second input also
read high (IV_3), causing the system to trip.
A similar implicant is shown in Table 10; however, in this
case the “D” value does not affect the top event. In this case,
the “Trip” signal reads “0”, in part due to an error with the
“Input_Voltage,” which has a value of “X.” The other nodes/
states in the run shown in Table 10 were the same as those in
Table 8 e Sequence for “OR ¼ 1” inductive analysis.
Sequence 3
(node)
Sequence 3
(state)
Sequence 3
(time step)
In_1 1 0
In_2 0 0
In_3 U 0
In_4 X 0
Mux_S 0 0
Clock_Enable 1 0
Prev_Clock þ 0
Reset_Signal 0 0
Logic_Block_Out 0 0
In_1 1 1
In_2 0 1
In_3 U 1
In_4 X 1
Mux_S 0 1
Clock_Enable 1 1
Clock 1 1
Reset_Signal 0 1
Logic_Block_Out 1 1
Table 9 e Implicant for “Trip” and “Total Flux High.”
Implicant 11
(node)
Implicant 11
(state)
Implicant 11
(time step)
Clock ± e1
Clock_En_State 1 e1
Clock_En_Sig En_1 e1
Clock_Period Normal e1
D D_High e1
I(k)_2 I(k)_2_Correct e1
I(k)_3 I(k)_3_Correct e1
Input_Voltage Correct Voltage e1
Prev_Clock 0 e1
Prev_Input_1 Correct_Input e1
Prev_Input_2 Correct_Input e1
Register_1_Out Reg_Input_Correct e1
Register_2_Out Reg_Input_Correct e1
Clock_Period Normal 0
D D_High 0
Phi Total Flux High 0
I(k)_2 I(k)_2_Correct 0
I(k)_3 I(k)_3_High 0
IV_3 High_Voltage_3 0
Input_Voltage Correct_Voltage 0
Register_1_Out Reg_Input_Correct 0
Register_2_Out Reg_Input_Correct
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Table 10.
Fig. 12 shows the ModelSim results for Table 9. The high
value for “D” causes the flux to read “High” and assist in
causing a trip (false alarm), when one of the other channels
also denotes a trip. In this case, the ModelSim results do not
specifically show the value for “D” (internal signals are not
always monitored). However, it is seen in the ModelSim re-
sults that the flux value (“Out1”) is higher than what it should
be, for the given inputs. Fig. 13 gives the simulation results for
Table 10, where it shows “No Trip” due to some failure with
the input. The “Input_Voltage” node (“In1” in Fig. 13) has an
input of “X,” which points to some form of input failures,
including those fromother parts of the system (as discussed in
Subsection 3.5). This leads to the value of “Phi” to also be “X,”
as seen in “Out1.” This causes the two out of three logics to
return a value of “0,” and the “Trip” value is seen as “0” in the
figure. This would have the potential tomiss a trip, if the value
for that input was supposed to be high enough.5. Discussion
This section discusses some of the advantages of DFM
discovered in this study whenmodeling FPGA-based systems.Fig. 11 e ModelSim results for “OR” logic block inductive
analysis.DFM is compared with static methods, simulation, and formal
methods, as presented in the following subsections.5.1. Advantages of DFM over static methods
As seen from the analyses in this section, the “Clock” signal is
a very important input for FPGA-based systems. The clock
states and edge trigger will determine if the data are output
through the register(s). However, the clock period and duty
cycle can also affect the system.
These effects are seen in the following examples using the
platinum comparator. A separate testbench was created to
introduce a sine wave into the system. It was seen that the 10-
nanosecond clock period will output the calculated neutron
power much faster than a 25-nanosecond clock period. The
“Odd Cycle” response changes the standard 50% duty cycle to
a 75% “1” and 25% “0” clock, with a period of 25 nanoseconds.
No effect on the output signal was seen. This is because the
register transitions are on clock edges only, so the duty clock
cycle does not affect the output value. In the DFM model, the
“Clock_Period” node could introduce a clock delay. The DFM
model analysis then returned a clock delay for the “Clock_-
Period” node that was longer than the standard. This means
that the DFM model can predict what could cause the clock
delay and the effect they could have on the system. While the
clock periods are usually very fast (of the order of nanosec-
onds), long delays can slow down the calculations and
lengthen the trip time.
An example of this is seen in Table 11. A clock delay causes
the “Clock_Period” to be “Long,” i.e., longer than it should be,
meaning that it will not undergo transition when it is sup-
posed to. Even though the “Input_voltage” changes to “High,”
the clock delay disallows the register to output the new value,
causing the value for “Phi” to be read as “Normal” and not as
“High”. In the end, this causes the voting logic to indicate a “No
Table 10 e Implicant for “No Trip.”
Implicant 3
(node)
Implicant 3
(state)
Implicant 3
(time step)
Input Voltage Input Voltage_X e1
D D_Correct e1
I(k)_3 X 0
Phi Total_Flux_X 0
D D_Correct 0
Fig. 13 e ModelSim results for “No Trip.”
Table 11e Prime implicants for “Missed Trip” due to clock
delays.
Implicant 1
(node)
Implicant 1
(state)
Implicant 1
(time step)
Clock_En_State 1 e1
Clock_En_Sig En_1 e1
Clock_Period Long e1
D Normal e1
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signal, as the trip would occur once the next clock transition
occurs. Modeling of the clock signals represents a potential
advantage of DFM over traditional (static) reliability analysis
methods. The clock is dynamic, as it will change its state (“0”
/ “1”) based on the clock period. In order to properly model
the effects of the clock, including clock delays, the analysis
must be able to capture these clock effects.
5.2. Advantages of DFM over simulation
It was seen in Section 7 that DFM is able to model the
important logic and components of FPGAs, as well as the
FPGA-based test system. The ModelSim simulations were
intended to prove that DFM could be used accurately for that
purpose. However DFM also possesses certain advantages
over simulators. ModelSim would work inductively, giving
outputs based on the inputs combinations. However, Mod-
elSim will not identify exactly what combinations of events
resulted in those outputs. It will just produce the outputs.
DFM, on the other hand, will provide a list of PIs that will
breakdown the potential cause of the certain events. Another
advantage of DFM is modeling error states. With ModelSim, it
is difficult to include the effect of hardware failures, whereas
it is more easily accomplished in DFM using additional error
nodes/states. ModelSim would provide evidence of logic er-
rors. However DFM can be used for that purpose as well.
Lastly, DFM can include probabilities in the model, for use in
probabilistic analyses, while ModelSim cannot.
5.3. Comparison of DFM and formal methods
In this study, DFM was selected to analyze the FPGA logic;
however, other methods could also be used, such as formal
methods. Formal methods can be defined as “mathematically
rigorous techniques and tools for the specification, design,Fig. 12 eModelSim results for “Trip” and “Total Flux High.”and verification of software and hardware systems” [32].
Formal methods utilize mathematical representations of
systems (software and/or hardware), to mathematically verify
that the system functions as intended for all input combina-
tions and as such can uncover errors in the software/hard-
ware. DFM and formal methods have some similarities, as
they both can be used to analyze the software and hardware
components of digital systems, and uncover errors in the
system. Additionally, both methods run into issues for very
complex, realistic systems, as it may not be feasible to fully
analyze a complex system using either method. Formal
methods have also seen use in the verification process of
FPGA-based systems [33]. However, it should be noted that at
the time of this study, formal methods have been used much
more widely than DFM.
Significant differences exist between DFM and formal
methods. DFM does not rely on the mathematically rigorous
formulations that formal methods do; instead it employs
user-input decision tables and PI/multivalued logic functions
to analyze the system. Although DFM has seen some use in
the direct validation of software logic (PIs that do not contain
any hardware error states imply a software error) [34], DFM is
generally used to analyze the causes of a top event or theI(k)_2 Correct Voltage e1
I(k)_3 High Voltage e1
Input Voltage Correct Voltage e1
Prev_Input_1 Correct_Input e1
Prev_Input_2 Correct_Input e1
Register_1_Out Reg_Input_Correct e1
Register_2_Out Reg_Input_Correct e1
Reset_State X 0
Reset_Signal R_0 0
Clock_Period Long 0
I(k)_2 Correct 0
I(k)_3 High 0
Phi Total_Flux_Normal 0
Input_Voltage High Voltage 0
Register_1_Out Reg_Input_Correct 0
Register_2_Out Reg_Input_Correct 0
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event is set to a “Trip,” then all possible scenarios, either
correct or erroneous, would be solved and stated in the PIs.
With DFM, the probabilities of each PI is given, along with the
probabilities of the top event, allowing for quantitative ana-
lyses, such as calculation of risk importance measures, or the
inclusion of DFM results in probabilistic safety assessment. In
contrast, formal methods will mathematically verify that the
system works for given inputs, but it does not allow for spe-
cific top events to be set, in order to determine theminimal cut
sets/PIs, and it will not perform probabilistic calculations.
Although DFM and formal methods share some connec-
tions for digital system analysis, they generally serve different
purposes. Formal methods are used to mathematically verify
a system, whereas DFM performs a reliability analysis more
similar to that of FTA or Markov methods; however, at the
time of this study, direct comparisons of the use of DFM and
formal methods were not seen in the literature.6. Conclusion
In this paper, the DFM has been applied to model and analyze
important aspects of FPGA-based systems that could find use
in nuclear plant safety and control systems. These aspects
included the underlying IEEE 1164 standard for VHDL, the use
of registers (D flip-flops), logic blocks, and the implementation
of an FPGA-based signal compensator and trip logic system.
The analysis results were compared using the ModelSim
simulations of the VHDL code, which confirmed that DFMwas
able to correctly model the FPGA logic and properties, making
DFM a potential option for the modeling and simulation of
FPGAs and FPGA-based systems. The effects of clock delay in
the FPGA were examined with DFM, which showed that the
clock error could delay the trip, causing a “Missed Trip”. The
modeling of clock effects shows one potential advantage of
DFM for modeling FPGA-based systems, over traditional static
methodologies.Conflicts of interest
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